wa al-amīr ̔Abd al-Qādir, 2 with only a brief poetic post-script and very little in the way of comment or contextualisation. It is given the inelegant but descriptive title 'That which the Amīr [̔Abd alQādir] wrote in answer to a question put to him by certain persons of distinction'.
3 Its authenticity is unquestioned, and the work in which it is presented represents a pre-eminent source in the Arabic language on ̔Abd al-Qādir's life. The text appears to have been composed in dhū al-ḥijja 1258/1842-3. 4 While never explicitly mentioned, the dramatic circumstances of that time are a clear pre-occupation in ̔Abd al-Qādir's treatise on migration. The text at hand, in spite of its overwhelmingly 'religious' content, is at the same time a definitely 'political' document, intended to bring about specific ends and respond to specific historical developments. Its combination of juridical precedent with political intent demonstrates the degree to which the 'religious and the political' are identified in ̔Abd al-Qādir's thought.
The following discussion will therefore analyse ̔Abd al-Qādir's treatise on migration (hijra) both in terms of its 'religious' and its 'political' aspects. It is important to note that this distinction, while useful to our analysis, is by no means intended to reflect a duality of concerns in the mind of ̔Abd al-Qādir himself. The modern conception of a religiously neutral 'politics' on which that distinction rests is not an empirical given, but rather the result of centuries of theorisation which were foreign to ̔Abd al-Qādir.
5 His 'politics' are expressed in religious language not least because there was simply no alternative open to him. In other words, this article will discuss the text at hand both in terms of the ('religious') views it explicitly espouses, and in terms of the ('political') consequences it implicitly encourages, without presuming that 'religion' and 'politics' represented discrete spheres of life for our subject. ̔Abd al-Qādir's discussion of religious, moral, and legal questions in the treatise at hand is clearly designed to influence the views on policy of his readership. This is not to presume that ̔Abd al-Qādir was adducing rationalisations, that he was either reasoning ex post facto or manipulating the beliefs of others for the sake of one transient strategic end or hidden agenda. It will be demonstrated in what follows that the weight of the traditions of judgement, argumentation, and adjudication drawn on by ̔Abd al-Qādir is sufficient to justify seeing him as speaking (and ultimately acting) from genuine conviction. Whether or not ultimately to espouse this interpretation must be left to the individual reader's judgement.
To recognise the substantiveness of the factors underlying such conviction, moreover, is also to suggest some re-appraisal of ̔Abd al-Qādir's career. It demands that our attempts at understanding ̔Abd al-Qādir be more sensitive to his particular intellectual heritage than has often been the case. While fundamentally religious motivation was often attributed to ̔Abd al-Qādir by early writers, it was often of so caricatured a form as to generate a considerable backlash from later scholars.
6 Mālikite legal reasoning has consequently played a smaller role in past studies of ̔Abd al-Qādir than Mendus, 1989, passim.] . Today's efforts by liberal political philosophers (such as John Rawls) to delineate a 'purely political', morally and theologically disinterested, politics remain works in progress. Nowhere in his writings does ̔Abd al-Qādir evince familiarity with the modern secular tradition (which largely postdates him), which many of his views in any case rule out. 6. The major study of ̔Abd al-Qādir's 'state building' by Raphael Danziger is the best example of this disillusionment. It has furthermore influenced later writers hoping to elucidate ̔Abd al-Qādir's motivations in terms more meaningful than the non-cognitive enthusiasms imputed by early sources.
analyses proceeding from modern Western conceptions of martial and charismatic power, and from colonial conceptual models of 'accommodationists and rejectionists'. It is not the intention here to repudiate such approaches, so much as to build upon them through more localised analyses. 7 The present article hopes to go some way toward exploring this issue, though the hitherto-neglected medium of ̔Abd al-Qādir's writing on migration (hijra).
Though the significance of the question of migration to ̔Abd al-Qādir's time has been recognised in the Western literature, 8 the document we intend to analyse here has thus far received only the brief mention. A paragraph in Martin's Muslim Brotherhoods in 19 th Century Africa mentions its existence, names it the 'Risālat al̔Ayān' (Treatise or Epistle of the Notable Figures), and notes its major theme: a novel contribution to the question of hijra or migration in Islamic law. 9 Martin is quite correct to point out that this is an issue left largely unaddressed in the first Islamic centuries, a fact which ̔Abd al-Qādir himself acknowledged toward the beginning of the risāla. What Martin omits to mention, and what is of particular relevance to ̔Abd al-Qādir's case, is that the question of migration did later receive considerable attention in the Mālikī juridical tradi-7. That 'power' is a diverse and contested concept is not ignored here. Most discussions of ̔Abd al-Qādir's rule have understood 'power' in relatively coercive terms as 'power over', however, and this represents one among many interpretations [e.g. Haugaard et al, 2002] . Amira Bennison's recent studies of ̔Abd al-Qādir's relationship with the Sultanate of ̔Abd al-Raḥmān provide a treatment of ̔Abd al-Qādir's 'power' as socially constituted and embedded. It is to exploring this connection of issues that the present article most hopes to contribute. 8. E.g. Piscatori in Michot, 2006 , p. XII. 9. Martin, 1976 is treatise makes a valuable contribution to a part of Islamic theory untouched by the classical writers on this subject. This is not because most of the classical Muslim thinkers composed their books at a time when the Muslim-controlled area was expanding, or remaining static, rather than contracting in size. Hence they had very little to say about Muslim populations stranded under Christian or other governments... the main theme in the Risala is the separation of Muslims from alien invaders and the breaking off of all contact with them.' tion to which ̔Abd al-Qādir adhered. This is a fact, moreover, which is directly linked to the particular historical and political experience of the Muslim Western Mediterranean in which Mālikism has been most concentrated. In the Arabic literature, however, the treatise at hand has been more extensively studied by Muḥammad bin ̔Abd al-Karīm in the course of his survey of Ḥukm al-hijra min khilāl thalāth rasā'il jazā'iriyya ('the law on migration through three Algerian treatises'). This text will be referred to again below, and furthermore makes a number of connections which have been absent or underrepresented in writing on ̔Abd al-Qādir in European languages. That analysis is based on a microfilm copy held in Rabat, 12 which differs only slightly from the text presented in the Tuḥfat al-zā'ir. There, the text is given the title Ḥusām al-dīn li-qaṭ̔i shabah al-murtaddīn.
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The major themes and characteristics of this text as presented in the Tuḥfat al-zā'ir will be discussed in what follows.
Migration and Authority -Inna ̔arḍī wāsi̔atun 14 Though the text of the risāla contains no subheadings, its central themes and their development are quite clearly traced. The entire text is organised around the question of the status and obligations of Muslims conquered by non-Muslims. It begins with an unequivocal insistence on the individual duty to migrate, or make hijra, from non-Muslim to Muslim territory. This duty is then discussed with respect to extenuating circumstances, and finally (and most critically) with respect to the status of those who renege on it to differing degrees. That it is generally obligatory to migrate from non-Muslim to Muslim territory is therefore a fundamental tenet of the text, and though some standard objections to this view are mentioned they are quickly rejected.
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'God -the Most High -does not excuse dwelling under the protective compact of the unbeliever [taḥta dhimmat al-kāfir], except for him who is unable to escape and who cannot take to any road, such as a blind man who can find no-one to guide him or the invalid with none to bear 13. Op. cit., pp. 43-66 ('the sword-edge to cut off the likes of the apostates'). 14. [Abun-Nasr, 1971, p. 246] , the border had previously been 'anomalous' [Bennison, 2002, p. 128] . That same treaty also saw the formalising of Moroccan political separation from ̔Abd al-Qādir [Blunt, 1947, p. 189] , again following pressure from France. Britain also brought diplomatic influence to bear so as to force the Sultanate's hand against ̔Abd al-Qādir so as to deprive France of a pretext for expansionist reprisals against Morocco [Danziger, 1977, p. 236] . 18. Abou el Fadl, 1994, p. 183. 19 . This term waṭan is today the standard translation for 'Nation', hence also waṭaniyya for 'Nationalism'. At the time of ̔Abd al-Qādir's writing, however, the term more typically denoted a more limited 'district or canton, or in most cases, to an area inhabited by a given tribe and co-extensive with it: often it would simply designate the tribe itself.' [Shinar, 1965, p. 154] 20. In his opening passages, ̔Abd al-Qādir castigates those whose cleaving to their waṭan prevents their divinely ordained migration through their belief that it sustains their physical existence (hūwa rāziquhu) [Tuḥfa, p. 411] . The suggestion is that it is not their land, but God (al-razzāq) on which they should rely -their failure to do so is tantamount to idolatry. Such people are those who 'lie to God in their conscience for the sake of [worldly] reward ' [ibid.] . He later re-iterates that 'neither the leaving of one's waṭan nor the loss of one's wealth are excuses for renouncing the hijra.' [Tuḥfa, p. 414] of the world in which Muslims are in the ascendant and in which Islamic law is practiced without interference.
̔Abd al-Qādir writes before the modern understandings of secularism or laicism, and he makes no mention of them. He does not envisage a non-religious politics which governs all religious communities disinterestedly. This is worth recalling again, not least because these political and intellectual conceptions would later become significant in undermining the sorts of arguments ̔Abd alQādir brings in this risāla.
21 It is also significant in that ̔Abd alQādir has recently been depicted as motivated by opposition to French 'secularism'.
22 It is rather the case that ̔Abd al-Qādir takes for granted that one religio-legal dispensation or another will be dominant in any given community. His argument for the obligation of migration is thereby inextricably bound up with his views that a Muslim community must be governed by Islamic law, and that this would be impossible under non-Muslim rule. This perspective is common (though not universal) in pre-modern Mālikī writing, and is largely informed by quite specific historical experiences, though it also has some Qur'ānic basis (touched on below). These historical experiences arose from the conquest of Muslim lands in the Iberian peninsula by Christian kingdoms, and the fate of those 'Muslims who entered under the protective compact [dhimma] of the Christians, whom the people of Algeria called hypocrites. Al-Māzirī asked the Judge of Sicily for his judgements. He replied that censure for this [entering under the protective compact of the Christians] is 21. E.g. Waardenburg, 2003, p. 265: '[t] he old rule that Muslims should not live under non-Muslim governments lost its sense when the right of religious freedom allowed them to practice their religion in Western countries.' It is also worth noting in this connection that the fatwa obtained from Qayrawān by the pro-French and anti-̔Abd al-Qādir Tijāniyya permitting Muslims to remain under French rule did so only on the explicit proviso that their religious obligations not be interfered with by the French [Piscatori in Michot, 2006, p. xiii] . 22. E.g. Heck (ed.), 2007, pp. 12-13. twofold: firstly, with respect to the Judge, and thereby of justice… residence in the domain of strife [dār al-ḥarb] under the leadership of unbelievers is not permitted. Secondly: with respect to jurisdiction, since the [Muslim] Judge is beholden to the unbelievers, and anyone in such a state shall not have his judgements considered legitimate according to Sharī̔a.'
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Khaled Abu el-Fadl's study of the question of migration or hijra from non-Muslim lands identifies Mālikism as the madhhab (jurisprudential school) which engaged most substantially with the matter. In his survey of this question in Islamic law, he furthermore links that body of juridical discussion to the experience of West Mediterranean Muslims, and particularly those of Iberia (al-andalus). 24 The process of the 'reconquest' of Iberia (la Reconquista) by Christian monarchs, famously culminating in the surrender of Muslim Granada in 1492, often involved the expulsion or forced conversion of non-Christians. The result was both an exodus of Jews and Muslims from Iberia to North Africa and elsewhere, and the development of a body of juridical rulings on the issue of conquest by non-Muslims with little interest in embracing Islam. Though hardly unanimous, 25 this body of rulings and opinions understandably tended to scepticism towards the possibility of Muslim life under non-Muslim rule 23. Tuḥfa, p. 416. 24. Abu el Fadl, 1994, p. 163 : 'historical circumstances forced most Mālikī jurists to adopt an absolute and uncompromising position. As Muslim territory came under siege and vast Muslim populations were threatened, most Mālikī jurists responded by demanding that all Muslims make a clear and decisive choice in favor of Muslim lands. Theological doctrines combined with political polemics because, for most Mālikīs, choosing to reside in a non-Muslim land was a religious and ethical decision as much as a political one. Muslim lands, Islam and a moral life, became inseparable. Making the political decision to favor non-Muslim territory is the ultimate unethical act.' 25. Miller, 2000, p. 258 : 'Rigorism was not the only option, however, and some Mālikī jurists were willing to entertain the possibility that Mudejars had sufficient reason, even obligation, to reside in dār al-ḥarb (abode of war).' and the concomitant need for a separation between spheres dominated by Muslims and by non-Muslims. It is also notable that the founding Imām Mālik is himself widely reported as having already tended strongly towards this position 26 -a fact to which ̔Abd alQādir refers repeatedly in this text. 27 The historical Mālikī position has in these respects been distinguished from the other three major madhāhib still extant, which have tended not to take so strong a prohijra position. 28 ̔Abd al-Qādir draws on this 'pro-migration' strand of Mālikī thought in the risāla at hand. He does this both through his choice of sources -many of which are Iberian, and most of which are Mālikī 29 -and the arguments he brings. ̔Abd al-Qādir's major source in this treatise is the Fāsī jurist al-Wansharīsī's Mi̔yār almu̔rib wa al-jāmi̔ al-mughrib ̔an fatāwā ̔ulamā' Ifrīqiya wa alAndalus wa al-Maghrib. 30 This major collection of Mālikī legal judgements dating from the 9 th to 15 th centuries contains many arguments paralleling those of ̔Abd al-Qādir in this treatise. Though the rulings assembled by al-Wansharīsī are not unanimous, the collection as a whole has been described as 'a resounding condemnation of Muslims who accepted Mudejar [Christian subject minor-26. Abu el Fadl, 1994 , p. 146: 'Saḥnūn (d. 2401 reports that Mālik (d. 179/796) strongly disapproved of Muslims travelling to the lands of non-believers for purposes of trade because they might become subject to the laws of unbelievers. The operative legal cause in Mālik's view is that Muslims will be forced to submit to non-Muslim law, an issue that later became a crux of legal discussions.' This view is also taken by Qāḍī Abū Bakr Ibn al-̔Arabī and Qāḍī Ibn Rushd [op. cit., pp. 146, 150-1], both of whom are drawn on by ̔Abd alQādir in this treatise. 27. Tuḥfa, p. 414, 416. 28. Abu el Fadl, 1994, passim.; Miller, 2000, p. 257. 29 . Those referred to by ̔Abd al-Qādir who are neither Mālikī, nor outside of madhhab distinctions through being universally accepted (e.g. al-Bukhārī, Abū Dāwūd) or independent legal reasoners (e.g. Ibn al-̔Arabī), are all Shāfi̔īs noted for ḥadīth scholarship and uṣūl al-fiqh (and hence most influential on Mālikism [e.g. fundamentally transhistorical norm is in question. 43 Qur'ānic utterances and Qur'ānic narratives are constantly returned to. As they do, ̔Abd al-Qādir moves between historical cases thematically rather than chronologically; history as a whole is seen as illustrative of sunnat allah, 44 the Divine Custom which governs it. To this end, ̔Abd al-Qādir 'simultaneously' evokes the experience not only of the Reconquista, but of Muḥammad and the Rāshidūn caliphs who immediately succeeded him. 45 He reminds his readers of the days of the prophets Moses/Mūsā and Samuel (though, like the Qur'ān, he does not name Samuel). 46 Finally and most obliquely he alludes to his present day -though here his approach is never explicit. In each case, the community of believers is beset by powerful adversaries, and fight or flight is ordained by God. In each case, the community is divided between those who obey and those who disobey the will of God -the latter invariably suffering the most damning consequences.
Though ̔Abd al-Qādir argues from juridical precedent, presenting himself as a humbly reticent 47 in support of his central legal argument, the Qur'ānic revelation is everywhere in evidence in this text.
As befits a man who is said to have memorised the Ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth collection of al-Bukhārī, 50 ̔Abd al-Qādir quotes the Qur'ān and ḥadīth liberally. Quotations and close paraphrases of Qur'ānic verses and sayings of the Prophet are closely interwoven with one another and with ̔Abd al-Qādir's own writings. This occurs to such an extent that some pages of the risāla contain considerably more quotation than they do words composed by ̔Abd al-Qādir himself; some are composed almost entirely of quotations. 51 These allusions are only occasionally attributed and never named chapter-and-verse, however; the text assumes its audience's ability to recognize Qur'ān and ḥadīth when they hear them. When he does point out that he is quoting scripture, it is to emphasise his central argument: 63 The copy of the text held on microfilm in Rabat, however, specifies that this exemption applies only to those who kill women and children 'unintentionally, while they have combatants among their number and it is night, such as is the case in raids before dawn while people are gathered together in their homes'. 64 ̔Abd al-Qādir's attack on Muslims who support non-Muslim rulers, then, is redolent of threat and its political message to his contemporaries contemplating French rule is clear. Taken as a whole, ̔Abd al-Qādir's treatise on migration is tantamount to a declaration of war against those Muslims who willingly subject themselves to rule by France. It consistently presents itself not as innovative or original, but as representing long-established schools in Mālikī legal thinking. While the consensus ̔Abd al-Qādir presents is arguably exaggerated, it is by no means obviously fictive.
̔Abd al-Qādir's discussions of the obligation to migrate from non-Muslim rule and the licitness of reprisals against those who fail to migrate are clearly the most salient aspects of the treatise at hand. It is also the element of the text which most obviously touches on 62. Tuḥfa, p. 421. 63. Tuḥfa, p. 65. political live wires of the time. The treatise evinces additional characteristics which are worthy of note, however. This is the case both with respect to the political context of its composition and to our understanding of ̔Abd al-Qādir's thought in general.
On Error and Omission; hal yuṣliḥ al-̔aṭṭār mā afsada aldahr? 65 In the text at hand, ̔Abd al-Qādir informs us on broader issues than the single question of migration through his contextualisation of that matter. He frames the ostensibly 'legal' question of migration within a broader 'moral' framework.
66 Conquest by non-Muslims is throughout the text presented in terms of moral 'trials' (fitan) 67 sent by God to test His followers and distinguish among them between the sincere and the hypocritical, between the moral and the immoral, between the observant and the lawless. The text therefore begins not with a discussion of the practical question of migration as a legal matter, but with a typology of moral failings: the risāla is presented as progressing from the general to the specific. During this opening discussion, ̔Abd al-Qādir indirectly informs readers about his 65. 'Will that fated to corrupt the age heal the physician?' Tuḥfa, p. 411. 66. The intention here is by no means to suggest that ̔Abd al-Qādir himself conceived of 'divine law' and 'morality' as two separate spheres. 67. 'The primary meaning [of fitna/fitan] is "putting to the proof, discriminatory test", as gold, Ḏjurdjānī says in his Ta̔rīfāt (ed. Flügel, Leipzig 1845, 171) , is tested by fire. Hence the idea of a temptation permitted or sent by God to test the believer's faith, which, for the man wedded to his desires, would have the appearance of an invitation to abandon the faith. "Your goods and children are fitna" (Ḳur'ān, VIII, 28; LXIV, 15). The term fitna occurs many times in the Ḳur'ān with the sense of temptation or trial of faith ("tentation d'abjurer", according to R. Blachère's translation); and most frequently as a test which is in itself a punishment inflicted by God upon the sinful, the unrighteous... on the other hand fitna will be essentially a state of rebellion against the divine Law in which the weak always run the risk of being trapped. The idea which is to become dominant is that of "revolt", "disturbances", "civil war", but a civil war that breeds schism and in which the believers' purity of faith is in grave danger.' [Gardet, L., EI2 entry on fitna].
views on the rule of law, 'inter-religious' issues, and the relationship between what one might describe as the 'normative and the mystical' in Islam. In so doing, he also sheds light on some of his more quixotic acts as ruler in North Africa, which conscientiously secular analyses of ̔Abd al-Qādir's Algerian career have found particularly difficult to explain.
̔Abd al-Qādir begins by dividing those who fail to uphold the commandments given to them by God into two groups, before again subdividing these into two more sub-groups. Each of these categories is characterised by a different moral, spiritual, or intellectual failing. One can infer from these their inverse corollaries: ̔Abd alQādir's typology of 'error' tells us a great deal about his positive conceptions of 'correctness'.
The first such dichotomy is that between the wrong-doer who strays from the straight path ordained by God through his own weakness and timorousness, and the wrong-doer who is indifferent to it altogether: 'So know this: the one who trusts in the unbelievers, who subjects himself to the protective compact of the people of perdition [al-dākhil taḥta dhimmat ahl albūwār] is one of two [types of] men. The first is one who lies to God in his conscience for the sake of reward -we take refuge in God from the unbelief and foolishness of such a one... And then there is that man who struggles greedily in the world [mutakālib ̔ala al-dunyā] and is deafened and blinded by his love for [the things of the world]. He desires to possess it, no matter by what means -be they those of Islām or of unbelief.'
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The first knows what is expected of him, yet fails to act properly. The latter, on the other hand, ignores or perverts his own un-derstanding of what is expected of him. The inverse corollaries of these failings are the virtues of obedience to and mindfulness of the Divine Law. Such obedience and mindfulness must not be trumped by any 'worldly' concern, ̔Abd al-Qādir asserts.
This rejection of 'worldliness' should not be understood as purely 'other-worldly', however. In all of this ̔Abd al-Qādir is taking quite conventional positions. The second dichotomy he makes between forms of wrong-doer is no less conventional, yet rather more informative, however. (The se-69. 'Literally, "the aims or purposes of the law". The term is used in works of legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and refers to the idea that God's law, the Sharī̔a, is a system which encompasses aims or purposes. If the system is correctly implemented, these aims will be achieved. From such a perspective, the Sharī̔a is not merely a collection of inscrutable rulings. One who claims that the Sharī̔a has maqāṣid is, therefore, making a statement concerning the rational nature of the Sharī̔a: that God intends to bring about a certain state of affairs by instituting particular laws.' Gleave, R.M, EI2 entry on maḳāṣid al-sharī̔a. 70. Dīn, nafs, and ̔aql all have significantly varying meanings in different contexts, as do their rough English equivalents as translated here. It is for this reason the 'dīn' is in this instance translated both as 'religion' and as 'religious obligation '. 71. Tuḥfa, p. 414. cond of these will be discussed here before the first as they appear in ̔Abd al-Qādir's text.) This form of error is that which derives from a simply negligent relationship with the Divine Law:
'The other man was one who had read a few chapters of jurisprudence [fiqh] and knew [̔alima] some of the rules for prayer, marriage and trade, reckoning [ẓanna] that he had reached an end qualifying him to be called an ̔ālim [religious scholar], and came to claim things about the religion of God of which he had not knowledge [̔ilm] . He defames God with falsehood, and who is more unjust than he who defames God with falsehood? Or his [Qur'ānic] verses with falsehood? Those who commit injustice will not know success!'
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The inverse corollary is clear: one must read more than 'a few chapters' of fiqh to master legal theory, and more than 'some' of the legal texts to master the law. A proper, comprehensive, and traditional education, ̔Abd al-Qādir asserts, is a precondition for making up one's own mind about one's religious obligations. He specifies this education still further in subsequent lines, by stating both its objects and its preconditions:
'[the negligent would-be ̔ālim] seeks guidance from [Qur'ānic' verses] In closing his discussion of this form of religious negligence, he first paraphrases and then quotes a rhyme about those who are especially ignorant in that they do not recognise their own ignorance:
'The donkey is in a better state than such a man, since a donkey's ignorance is simple [jahl al-ḥimār basīṭ], whereas this man's ignorance is complex [murakkab] . "The donkey of wise Thomas said -if this age were just, I should ride / as my ignorance is simple -and my master's is complex".'
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As well as including an amusing play on words -'complex' (murakkab) ignorance is attributed the 'rider' (rākib) of the donkey -this couplet also contains an anti-Christian resonance. Probably originating with the prolific Ḥanbalī scholar Abū al-Faraj ibn al-Jawzī, 75 its attributing of 'complex ignorance' to a Christian 76 reinforces the stratum of religious polemic in ̔Abd al-Qādir's treatise. 77 Christians are depicted throughout the text as 'proud and self-important. Which is to say they are transgressors -that is they do not stop at any condition or contract [and be bound by it].' 78 This view is not simple bigotry, it must be remembered. In addition to the traditional theological view of the corruption of the (ultimately Islamic) Revelation 74. Tuḥfa, pp. 411-412. 75. Specifically his 'Information on Fools and Dupes' (Akhbār al-ḥumqā wa al-mughaffalīn), which contains many such couplets to illustrate its critiques. ̔Abd al-Qādir does not name this rhyme's author, and it is possible that he encountered it elsewhere. 76. Thomas, Tūmā, is a conspicuously Christian name (hence for instance Bāb Tūmā, the Christian district of Damascus whose inhabitants ̔Abd al-Qādir and others were famously to defend during the riots of 1860). 77. These lines are particularly redolent of the perennial Muslim scepticism of the Christian Mystery of the Trinity -typically seen by polemicists as an overcomplicated and retrograde form of the 'pure monotheism' (tawḥīd) at the heart of Islam. 78. Tuḥfa, p. 418. by Christians (taḥrīf), 79 and the Reconquista experience discussed above, ̔Abd al-Qādir writes in the context of French expansionism and treaty violations. The relative propensities of Christians and Muslims to observe their obligations and keep their words is furthermore also the major theme of ̔Abd al-Qādir's later text al-Miqrāḍ al-ḥādd li-qaṭ̔ lisān muntaqis dīn al-islām bil-bāṭil wa al-ilhād.
This anti-Christian aspect of this treatise should not be seen as categorical. ̔Abd al-Qādir does not argue for the destruction of Christianity nor for the killing of Christians per se. The manner in which he argues against Christian rule consistently assumes the possibility of co-habitation, which was in any case characteristic of ̔Abd al-Qādir's 'state' which employed numerous Christians and Jews. ̔Abd al-Qādir's constant references to the 'dhimma' of the non-Muslims is presented as a rhetorical inversion of what he assumes to be the natural order wherein Muslims offer dhimmī status to non-Muslim monotheists. Once Islam is in the ascendant, Christianity in itself does not present a problem to ̔Abd al-Qādir: '[T]he Nazarenes do not honour their agreements unless the word of Islam is most exalted and its power most prominent'. 80 This understanding of ̔Abd al-Qādir's perspective addresses the perplexity expressed by Danziger 81 as to the apparent contradiction between ̔Abd alQādir's famously cordial comportment toward Christians under his power 82 and his 'studied insolence' 83 towards leaders such as General Bugeaud who sought to assert power over him. This is in fact as conservative an attitude as any of those expressed in the discussion above. Such conservatism extends also to ̔Abd al-Qādir's attitude towards Sufism.
In this treatise, ̔Abd al-Qādir draws on figures such as Malikī faqīh al-Qayrawānī (from whose work he would teach while cap-79. E.g. Tarakci and Sayar, 2005 . 80. Tuḥfa, p. 418, emphasis added. 81. Danziger, 1977 , pp. 182-3. 82. Abun-nasr, 1971 Churchill, 1867, p. 208; Danizger, 1977 , p. 182. 83. Blunt, 1947 tive in France) 84 who were hostile to Sufism.The text includes no condemnation of Sufism -in fact, it makes almost no reference to its author's 'marabout' status. One can infer from the content and intention of the text, however, something of the author's ' Ghazālīan', 85 conception of the orthodoxy of Sufism as in accord with Shariah law. It is to this that the final subcategory of error fruitfully may be related. ̔Abd al-Qādir condemns the 'one who knew the truth [̔arafa al-ḥaqq] and resisted it… since he knew, [yet] his knowledge was of no use to him, and he renounced truth along with his knowledge of it [jaḥada al-ḥaqq ma̔ ma̔rifatuhu bih]. This is one of the many sources of unbelief. Such was the unbelief of some who were present at the time of the Prophet (SAAWS) and who witnessed his inimitable acts [i.e. the 'inimi- This critique forms a pair with the previously discussed condemnation of 'ignorance'. Both passages in ̔Abd al-Qādir's treatise are characterised by the use of a different verb for 'knowing', ̔ilm and ma̔rifa, which may carry a particular resonance when used as a pair.
88 One might broadly describe these two critiques as 84. Tuḥfa, pp. 421, 529. 85. E.g. Jackson (trans.), 2003 , p. 115. 86. Qur'ān 6:33 87. Tuḥfa, p. 413. 88. Schimmel [1975 differentiates these in the context of Islamic thought as being based on 'discursive reason' (̔ilm) and 'divine mystery' (ma̔rifa). As distinct from conscious ̔ilm, the more 'mystical' 'Ma̔rifa assumes not only the abolition of the consciousness of self at the level of the soul, the empirical self, but an absence of self at the level of the heart and the spirit… But it is focusing more on the quantitative and on the qualitative, respectively; the first critique uses only the roots ḥayn-lam-mīm, while the second employs both sets. In the former case it is the content of knowledge which the erring party neglects, while in the latter case it is also the epistemological status of knowledge which is undervalued. This connotation, whether reads it from the text or not, is in any event wholly congruent with the overall thrust of the treatise; the treatise is by no means a work in a special Sufi genre, but rather an appeal to the pre-eminence of the Shariah as the source of obligation for all Muslims, Sufi or otherwise. Moreover, ̔Abd al-Qādir attributes the maqāṣid commonplace quoted above (with respect to the priority of religious obligation over all other concerns) specifically to Sufis. 89 In each case, sincere, educated, and mindful adherence to the Qur'ānic revelation is presented as the antithesis of all kinds of intellectual and spiritual error.
While these assertions may be argued to have been strategically appealing, 90 they have also been widely held because of their intrinsic appeal. ̔Abd al-Qādir was circumstantially inclined towards law-abiding mysticism before he assumed political power. One must recall ̔Abd al-Qādir's inheritance as son of a Shaykh and his primary Sufī affiliation 91 to a ṭarīqa, like its founder and ̔Abd al-Qādir's namesake ̔Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī (to whose grave in Baghdād the definitely a misuse to translate ma̔rifa automatically as "gnosis". Were it not so, it would be necessary to render the plural al-ma̔ārif by "the gnoses" (listed above), which would obviously be unacceptable' [Arnaldez and Corbin, EI2 entry on ma̔rifa]. Other broad distinctions between ̔ilm and ma̔rifa might focus on mediated versus unmediated knowledge, or the contrast between compound and singular intelligibles. 89. Tuḥfa, p. 414. 90. That is, as a 'lowest common denominator' uniting factor among imperfectly cohesive tribes and ṭarīqas in the region. Against this view, one must remember the damaging political effects of ̔Abd al-Qādir's botched campaign against the Tijāniyya (see below). 91. ̔Abd al-Qādir, like his father and members of most other ṭuruq, was also connected to other 'Sufi orders' (such as the Raḥmāniyya in Algeria and Shādhiliyya in the Hejaz) during his lifetime. young ̔Abd al-Qādir had made a pilgrimage) often associated with legism. Such inclinations have furthermore been common throughout the history of organised Sufism outside 92 and within 93 the North African context from which ̔Abd al-Qādir writes. His later writings re-assert this 'lawful' orientation repeatedly, 94 moreover, while his condemnation of Syrian Sufis inclined towards an antinomian rejection (or 'transcending') of Islamic law has also been noted. 95 In any event, appeals to legal rectitude have historically been common in intra-Sufi polemic, for reasons not obviously extraneous to the polemicists' practices of Sufism.
While not insignificant in themselves, these implicit and explicit assertions of the orthodoxy of Sufism as subject to Islamic law by ̔Abd al-Qādir is not a defence against those who would argue against such a view. At the time of this treatise's writing, before the spread of modernist and salafī critiques, Sufism of one sort or another was an accepted aspect of North African religious culture. Moreover, Vincent Cornell's broad survey of hagiographic literature from the region has demonstrated the 'sine qua non' role of socially understood orthopraxy in North African 'living sainthood'. 96 Rather, ̔Abd al-Qādir mentions this form of error within a specific normative context: his assertion of the primacy of the Shariah, including the legal obligation of able-bodied Muslims to leave territory conquered by non-Muslims. As such, it carries a definite political implication -an attack on those Muslims (including Sufis) who called for submission to French rule.
Individual and tribal defectors to French territory were a cause of concern to ̔Abd al-Qādir throughout his career in Algeria, are addressed in every treaty he signed with France, and are clearly a target of this treatise. 97 The circumstances of this treatise's writing, however, bring also ṭarīqa defectors to the fore. Chief among these, from ̔Abd al-Qādir's perspective, was Muḥammad al-Ṣaghīr al-Tijānī, head of the ̔Ayn Māḍī Tijāniyya. This figure supported French colonial policy 98 through his urging that Muslims should submit to French rule, and has been maligned by Algerian anticolonialists in the 20 th century for the same reasons. It was against him that ̔Abd al-Qādir in 1838 led one of his most strategically ill-advised campaigns -a lengthy, costly, and embarrassing siege. While other reasons, such as tribal rivalries 99 and poor military planning, 100 have been suggested for this campaign, it seems likely that ̔Abd al-Qādir's understanding of Mālkite law was a necessary (if not necessarily sufficient) motive. It is in relation to that campaign and its aftermath (an open Tijānī treaty with France, and increased calls for Muslim submission) that ̔Abd al-Qādir appears to be writing in this case.
If this inference is correct, then this strand of ̔Abd al-Qādir's argument in this treatise is particularly striking in relation to the centrality accorded 'Maraboutism' 101 in many studies. ̔Abd al-Qādir is in fact arguing against 'maraboutism' (at least as understood in Weberian terms as a variety of 'charismatic authority') by insisting that marabouts (Sufis) are not independent authorities in themselves but rather are subject to the same laws as every other Muslim. In this, his position also seems consistent with that repeatedly taken in his later Damascene writings in the genre of Ibn al-̔Arabī. 102 The fact that the lawless ̔ārif is often considered more dangerous than the incompetent ̔ālim (erring 'qualitatively' and not just 'quantitatively') supports both this view and the need to attack the pro-French Tijāniyya which ̔Abd al-Qādir apparently felt. 103 This attitude might even be distinguished from his less warlike coldness toward the vestiges of Ottoman government in the east, as these presented a less profound threat to the faith as understood by ̔Abd al-Qādir. Such 'theological' readings are not mutually exclusive with more materialist analyses to which his actions have been subjected, however. Such a dilemma is itself reliant on more secular presuppositions than ̔Abd al-Qādir's background suggests or his writing evinces 104 .
Conclusion
The text analysed here demonstrates that theology, morality, politics, law, and mysticism were inextricably bound up in the thinking of ̔Abd al-Qādir. The result seems to have been an intensification of certainty in and commitment to the ethico-legal tradition in which he was raised. The text at hand also allows us to describe the content of that tradition as understood by ̔Abd al-Qādir, moreover. It argues from a predominantly Mālikī legal perspective that migration from territory governed by non-Muslims to lands governed by Muslims is obligatory. It argues that material support for non-Muslims engaged in warfare against Muslims is illicit and warrants punitive reprisals. It argues that legal judgements require a significant degree of education, and access to the authoritative sources of Qur'ān and sunna. It sees the reaching of such judgements primarily as a matter of exegesis and casuistry. It assumes the existence of God and the finality of the Qur'ānic revelation. It asserts that all Muslims (including Sufis) are subject to the norms of Islamic law. It repeatedly states that it is God's custom to sends trials and temptations in order to test the righteousness of humanity and divide the righteous from the hypocritical. Finally, it presumes that every community will be governed by one or another (and ideally Islamic) religious tendency, to which minorities will be beholden by protective compacts [dhimmam] .
In all of this, this treatise is a fundamentally conservative text. The views it espouses are all widely to be found in North African intellectual and religious history for many centuries prior to its writing. The novelty attributed it by some does not appear to be justified, and is certainly disavowed by the author himself, who consistently presents himself as a transmitter of earlier rulings. Nor does it seem clear that its conception of the rule of law is of a 'modern' as opposed to 'mediaeval' kind.
105 Its most unconventional, but again not unprecedented, feature, is the degree to which it conflates hypocrisy [nifāq] with apostasy and unbelief, a tendency argued by Amira Bennison to have been common in North African argumentation at the time.
nialism, declining Muslim influence, and anti-colonial nationalism. It is not self-evident that ̔Abd al-Qādir saw history in those terms, however, and the text at hand offers no suggestion that he did. As has been suggested above, it was to be characteristically modern developments which were later to weaken the strand of Mālikī thought which ̔Abd al-Qādir propounded in this treatise. There seems little justification for thinking that ̔Abd al-Qādir was prescient of these developments, and therefore little reason not to read him as sincere in his interpretation of his duties as an observant Muslim -especially since he adhered to his interpretation in respect of incidents where these weakened his strategic standing. ̔Abd al-Qādir's treatise on migration inclines one to the conclusion that his motives owed less to 'modernity' than his modern significance might suggest, and more to conviction than his strategic successes might imply. However sceptical one may be about the deployment of religious argumentation in the political sphere, or the propounding of one strand of juridic thinking over another, it seems clear that ̔Abd al-Qādir was at least to some extent following in a tradition developed centuries before the French invasion of North Africa. One might ask, as does Muḥammad bin ̔Abd al-Karīm, above: 'Why should he not?' 
